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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The  actions  of the  Federal  Reserve  System  deter- 
mine  the  nominal  (dollar)  expenditure  of the  public. 
A  key  issue  for  policymakers  is what  variable  best 
measures  the  impact  of  monetary  policy  actions  on 
nominal  expenditure.  l The  press  uses  changes  in the 
funds  rate  as an  indicator  of  the  thrust  of  monetary 
policy.  Declines  are  labeled  “easing  moves,”  that  is, 
changes  that  will  augment  the  rate  of  growth  of 
nominal  expenditure,  and  conversely  with  increases. 
The  usefulness  of  the  funds  rate  as  an  indicator, 
however,  is contradicted  by  current  experience.  The 
funds  rate  fell  from  almost  10 percent  in May  1989 
to  3  percent  in  September  1992.  Over  this  same 
period,  however,  the  trend  rate  of growth  of nominal 
GDP  dropped  from  7 percent  to  around  4 percent. 
This  paper  examines  whether  the  monetary  aggre- 
gate  M2  offers  useful  information  about  the  impact 
of monetary  policy  actions  on  nominal  expenditure.z 
By definition,  nominal  expenditure  equals  the  amount 
of dollars  in circulation  times  the  average  number  of 
times  per  year  those  dollars  turn  over  against  nominal 
output.  That  is,  nominal  expenditure  is  the  quan- 
tity  of  money  times  the  velocity  of  circulation  of 
money.  M’2 is useful  as  a definition  of  money  if its 
velocity  is a simple,  predictable  function  of  a small 
number  of  variables.  Equivalently,  M2  is  a  useful 
definition  of money  if unpredictable  changes  in M2 
velocity  are  small  compared  to  changes  in  nominal 
expenditure. 
Section  II  examines  the  predictability  of  M2 
velocity.  Section  III discusses  M2  indicator  variables. 
i As  shown  by  the  accounting  of  the  national  income  and 
product  accounts,  aggregate  nominal  expenditure  for  final 
products  (aggregate  nominal  demand)  equals  aggregate  nominal 
output  (aggregate  nominal  supply)  minus  changes  in  business 
inventories.  Aggregate  nominal  output  (within  a country’s  own 
borders)  is  the  dollar  value  of  gross  domestic  product  (GDP). 
Again,  as an accounting  matter,  aggregate  nominal  output  equals 
aggregate  nominal  income. 
2 It is important  to distinguish  among  instruments,  indicators  and 
targets.  The  usefulness  of the  fundsrate  as an instrument  is not 
discussed  here:  nominal  GDP  is  certainlv  higher  now  relative 
to what  it would  have  been  if the  Fed  had  hot  rowered  the  funds 
rate.  The  use  of M2  as a target  is also  not  discussed.  The  issue 
is  whether  the  behavior  of  M2  offers  more  useful  information 
about  aggregate  nominal  expenditure  than  the  funds  rate. 
Section  IV examines  arguments  that  special  factors 
are  currently  making  ML? velocity  less  predictable. 
II.  IsM2 VELOCITYPREDICTABLE? 
This  section  examines  the  predictability  of  M2 
velocity  initially  by  checking  whether  growth  rates 
of nominal  GDP  move  with  growth  rates  of M’2 over 
long  periods  of  time.  It  then  examines  M2  velocity 
more  carefully  by  estimating  an M2  demand  regres- 
sion  equation.  Table  1 shows  annual  growth  rates 








Table  1 
Growth  Rates of Nominal  GDP  and 
M2  Lagged Two Years 
GDP  Growth  M2  Growth 
annual  average  annual 
11.8  12.1 
8.1  12.5 
8.7  9.9 
11.5  (10.8)  6.1 
11.6  9.3 
13.1  13.0 
11.5  12.7 
average 
(10.9) 
1980  8.8  8.5 
1981  11.9  8.3 
1982  3.9  8.0 
1983  8.1  9.4 
1984  10.9  (9.0)  9.3  (7.8) 
1985  6.9  12.5 
1986  5.7  8.2 
1987  6.4  8.9 
1988  7.9  8.2 
1989  7.0  6.6 
1990  5.1  (5.2)  5.2  (5.0) 
1991  2.9  3.9 
1992  5.3 
1993  3.2 
Notes:  The  numbers  in  parentheses  show  average  GDP  growth  for  the  years 
1973  to  1979,  1980  to  1988,  and  1989  to  1991  and  average  M2 
growth  for  the  corresponding  periods  two  years  earlier. 
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ments  in  M2  and  its  velocity  from  obscuring  the 
longer-run  relationship  between  growth  in M2  and 
nominal  output.)  Over  the  three  periods  shown,  the 
trend  rate  of growth  of nominal  GDP  matches  fairly 
closely  the  trend  rate  of  growth  of  M2. 
If  velocity  is  stable,  the  rate  of  inflation  will 
correspond  over  long  periods  of time  to  the  excess 
of  the  rate  of  growth  of  money  over  output.  To 
illustrate,  over  the  three  decades  from  1960  through 
1990,  the  excess  of  the  annualized  rate  of growth 
of  M2  (8.1  percent)  over  the  annualized  rate  of 
growth  of real  GDP  (3.0  percent)  was  5.1  percent, 
while  annualized  inflation  (measured  by the  implicit 
GDP  price  deflator)  was  4.9  percent. 
The  inverse  of velocity,  the  fraction  of its income 
the  public  wants  to  hold  in the  form  of money,  ex- 
presses  the  real  value  of money.  The  remainder  of 
the  section  examines  the  stability  of M2  velocity  by 
examining  the  stability  of M2  demand  regressions, 
which  predict  the  behavior  of real  M2.  Specifically, 
this  section  looks  at  the  prediction  errors  from  an 
updated  version  of  a  money  demand  regression 
similar  to one  estimated  by  Friedman  and  Schwartz 
(1982).  (Estimation  details  are in the  appendix.)  The 
period  of  estimation  is  from  19 1.5 to  1991.  Using 
annual  observations,  real  M2  is  regressed  on  real 
output  and  on  opportunity  cost  variables  measuring 
the  rate  of return  on  financial  market  assets  and  on 
*physical assets.  The  financial market  opportunity  cost 
of holding  M’Z is proxied  for  by  the  difference  be- 
tween  the  commercial  paper  rate  (R) and a weighted 
average  of  the  explicit  rates  of  return  paid  on  the 
components  of M’Z (RMZ).  [Hetzel(l989)  describes 
the  construction  of  RMZ.] 
Following  Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1982),  the 
regression  employs  the percentage  change  in nominal 
output  as  a proxy  for  the  market  yield  on  physical 
assets.  The  market  yield  on  physical  assets  (land, 
buildings,  machinery,  consumer  durables,  etc.) 
possesses  two  components:  a real rate  of return  and 
an  anticipated  change  in dollar  value.  The  percent- 
age  change  in  nominal  output  also  possesses  two 
components:  the  rate  of growth  of real  output  and 
the  rate  of inflation.  These  two  components  of the 
percentage  change  in nominal  output  proxy  for  the 
two  components  of  the  market  yield  on  physical 
assets.3 
3 This  proxy  makes  two  assumptions.  First,  there  is a positive 
relationship  between  fluctuations  in  real  output  and  the 
economy’s  equilibrium  real  rate  of  interest.  When  economic 
activity  strengthens,  the  real rate  of interest  must  rise to achieve 
Over  the  entire  estimation  period,  the  fitted  M2 
demand  function  exhibits  considerable  stability.  This 
stability  can  be  observed  directly  by noting  that  M2 
velocity  (nominal  output  divided  by M2)  has fluctu- 
ated  around  a value  of 1.63  since  191.5; M2  (real and 
nominal)  and  output  (real  and  nominal)  would  not 
gravitate  around  each  other  over  time  unless  un- 
predictable  changes  in  the  demand  for  real  M2 
cancelled.  Particularly  in  the  post-World  War  II 
period,  prediction  errors  are  relatively  small.  Over 
the  period  1950  to  199 1, the  mean  absolute  errors 
in predicting  the  level  of real M2  and  changes  in real 
M2  are,  respectively,  2.2  and  1.0  percent.  (Errors 
are from  the  regressions  in Tables  Al  and A2 of the 
appendix.)  The  exception  to the  statement  that  the 
public’s  M2  demand  function  was  stable  over  the 
period  1915 to the  present  is that  after the  mid-1960s 
the  public’s  demand  for  real  M2  became  less  sen- 
sitive  to  variation  in  market  rates. 
The  regression  equation  in first differences,  shown 
in  Table  A2  of  the  appendix,  generates  errors  in 
1989,  1990 and  199 1 that  cumulate  to an overpredic- 
tion  of real  ML?  of 5.3  percent.  This  overprediction 
of real  M’Z has  continued  to  grow  during  1992.  As 
noted  above,  M2  is a useful  definition  of money  if 
unpredictable  changes  in  M2  velocity  are  small 
macroeconomic  equilibrium,  and  conversely.  The  real  compo- 
nent  of changes  in  nominal  output  then  can  proxy  for changes 
in the  real rate  of return  on physical  assets.  Second,  the  behavior 
of inflation  is such  that  the  public  extrapolates  realized  inflation 
in predicting  future  inflation. The  nominal  component  of changes 
in nominal  output  then  can  proxy  for the  anticipated  change  in 
the  dollar  value  of physical  assets. 
4 Judd  and  Trehan  (1992)  contend  that  the  long-term  stability 
of M2  velocity  is  a “statistical  artifact”  due  to  the  choice  of a 
definition  for M2  in  1980 designed  to make  M2  velocity  stable. 
Their  contention  is inaccurate.  Attempts  to circumvent  Regula- 
tion  Q  ceilings  on  interest  rates  that  were  kept  low  relative  to 
market  rates  led  in  the  1970s  to  the  appearance  of new  finan- 
cial  instruments,  especially  money  market  mutual  funds  and 
NOW  accounts.  These  new  instruments  necessitated  a redefini- 
tion  of the  monetary  aggregates.  The  Board  staff  did  attempt 
to  determine  the  relative  stability  of  the  public’s  demand  for 
money  using  alternative  definitions  of the  monetary  aggregates, 
but  it was  unsuccessful.  At  the  time  of the  redefinition  of the 
aggregates,  the  new  instruments  had  been  introduced  so recently 
and  were  still  issued  in such  small  amounts  that  their  inclusion 
in  a particular  monetary  aggregate  did  not  affect  econometric 
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analysis  of money  demand.  For  example,  money  market  mutual 
funds  were  insienificant  until  1978 and  NOW  accounts  were  not 
introduced  nat?onwide  until  1981.  In  the  end,  M2  was  con- 
structed  a priori to include  Ml  and  savings  instruments  available 
in  small  denominations  and  basically  redeemable  at  par. 
There  is,  however,  a  problem  in  the  definition  of M2.  M2 
includes  time  deposits  of less  than  $100.000.  As  prices  rise,  the 
real  value  of  the  cutoff  falls.  In  order  to  prevent  M2  velocity 
from  rising  as  a consequence  of  the  definition,  the  $100,000 
cutoff  should  be  indexed  to  the  price  level. 
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condition  is  reasonably  well  satisfied,  despite  the 
recent  overprediction  of real M2  (underprediction  of 
M2 velocity).  Money  demand  disturbances  have  not 
been  the  primary  determinants  of the  rate  of growth 
of nominal  output  in recent  years.  Taken  alone,  the 
M2  demand  errors  for  1989,  1990,  and  1991  would 
have  increased  the  rate  of growth  of nominal  GDP. 
Instead,  beginning  in  mid-1989,  the  trend  rate  of 
growth  of nominal  GDP  fell from  about  7 to  4 per- 
cent.  The  influence  of disturbances  in the  demand 
for  real  M2  has  been  swamped  by  the  reduction  in 
the  trend  rate  of growth  of M2  that  began  in  1987. 
III.  AN  M2  INDICATOR VARIABLE 
This  section  draws  on  the  results  of Section  II to 
construct  two  related  measures  of  the  impact  of 
monetary  policy  actions  on  nominal  expenditure. 
One,  a  marginal  monetary  indicator,  measures  the 
effect  of contemporaneous  policy  actions  on nominal 
expenditure.  The  other,  an  average  monetary  indi- 
cator,  measures  the  cumulative  effect  of  policy 
actions,  contemporaneous  and  past,  on  nominal 
expenditure.  These  indicators  are  suggested  by  the 
quantity  equation: 
(1)  M-V  =  Y, 
where  M is M2,  V is M2  velocity,  and  Y is aggregate 
nominal  expenditure  (output  or  income).  Equation 
(1) can be expressed  in percentage  change  form  (with 
continuous  compounding)  as  (2): 
(2)  Am  +  Av  =  Ay, 
where  A indicates  a first  difference  and  small  letters 
indicate  the  natural  logarithm  of a variable  (the change 
in the  logarithm  is a percentage  change).  Setting  Am 
equal  to  actual  percentage  changes  in  M2  and  Av 
equal  to predicted  percentage  changes  in M2  velocity 
makes  (2)  operational  as  an  average  monetary  in- 
dicator  variable,  Ayp. 
A.  An  Average  Monetary  Indicator 
The  regression  results  reported  in Table  A2 of the 
appendix  can give empirical  content  to Avp, predicted 
percentage  changes  in  M2  velocity.  Changes  in 
velocity  are  a  function  of  changes  in  the  financial 
5 Equivalently,  M’Z offers  useful  information  about  the  growth 
of nominal  expenditure  if unpredictable  changes  in the  public’s 
demand  for  real  M2  are  small  relative  to  the  sum  of  changes 
in  M2  and  of  predictable  changes  in  M2  velocity  (real  M2 
demand). 
market  opportunity  cost,  which  is proxied  for by the 
difference  between  the  commercial  paper  rate  (R) 
and the weighted  average  of the  explicit  interest  rates 
paid  on the  components  of M2  (RM2):  (R -RM2). 
Changes  in  velocity  due  to  changes  in  this  oppor- 
tunity  cost  variable  are denoted  by Av[A(R  -  RM2)]. 
Equation  (2)  then  becomes 
(3)  Ayp  =  Am  +  Av[A(R  -RM2)]. 
A proxy  for predicted  velocity  in (3) is constructed 
as a distributed  lag of changes  in the  financial  market 
opportunity  cost  variable  with  the  estimated  coeffi- 
cients  from  the  regression  in the  appendix  Table  A2 
used  as weights.  The  signs  of the  estimated  coeffi- 
cients  reported  in  Table  A2  change  because  the 
regression  predicts  changes  in real  M2  (the  inverse 
of  velocity)  and  the  proxy  predicts  changes  in 
velocity.  Predicted  changes  in velocity  due to changes 
in the  financial  market  opportunity  cost  are  proxied 
for  by  (4)  before  1964. 
(4)  Av[A(R  -RM2)]  = 
2.47  A(Rt-RM2t)  + 
2.50  A(Rt-r  -  RM2t-1)  t 
1.65  A(Rt-2  -  RM2t-a) 
Starting  in  1964,  (4)  changes  to  (5)  because  of  a 
reduction  in the  interest  sensitivity  of M2  demand.6 
(5)  Av[A(R  -RM2)]  = 
1.16  A(Rt -RM2t)  + 
1.19  A(Rt-r  -RM2t-I)  + 
.34  A(Rt-a  -  RM2i-2) 
Figure  1 graphs  actual  annual  percentage  changes 
in nominal  output  and predicted  percentage  changes 
in nominal  output,  Ayp,  given  by  (3).  In  (3),  Am  is 
annual  percentage  changes  in M2,  and  Avp is given 
by  (4)  before  1964  and  (5)  thereafter.  Predicted 
changes  in nominal  expenditure  track  actual  changes 
in  nominal  output  reasonably  well  over  the  period 
1918  to  1991.  The  actual  change  in nominal  output 
is underpredicted  in 199 1 by  1.2 percentage  points. 
6 This  reduction  in interest  sensitivity  could  reflect  an  increase 
in cyclical changes  in short-term  interest  rates.  The  public  began 
to  adjust  its  money  balances  less  in  response  to  a  change  in 
interest  rates  because  it  anticipated  the  change  would  be 
reversed  in time.  Alternatively,  the  appearance  orlarge  negoti- 
able  CDs,  which  are  not  included  in  M2,  could  have  drawn 
interest-sensitive  balances  out  of  M2. 
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of growth  of  nominal  output  (GDP)  from  1988  to 
1991. 
B.  A  Marginal  Monetary  Indicator 
The  monetary  indicator  of  nominal  expenditure 
shown  in Figure  1 measures  the  cumulative  impact 
of Fed  actions.  In particular,  the  component  of this 
indicator  that  predicts  changes  in  M2  velocity 
depends  upon  the  behavior  of  current  and  past 
market  rates.  This  section  proposes  a  monetary 
indicator  that  indicates  how  contemporaneous  Fed 
actions  affect  the  value  of this  cumulative  measure. 
The  suggested  marginal  indicator  is the  difference 
between  the rate  of growth  of nominal  output  (GDP) 
and  the  short-term  rate  of interest.  As discussed  in 
Section  II,  Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1982)  use  the 
rate  of growth  of nominal  output  as a proxy  for  the 
market  rate  of return  on physical  assets.  The  short- 
term  rate  of interest  is the  traditional  policy  instru- 
ment  of the  Fed.’  An  unusually  high  value  for  the 
difference  between  the  rate of growth  of nominal  out- 
put  (GDP)  and  the  short-term  rate  of  interest, 
therefore,  indicates  that  the  rate  of return  on capital 
is high  relative  to market  rates,  and  conversely.  This 
proxy  variable  for  a  difference  in  interest  rates 
measures  a relative  price,  not a nominal  (dollar) price. 
The  Fed,  therefore,  cannot  control  it in a sustained 
way.  It  can,  however,  produce  transitory  increases 
by  allowing  monetary  accelerations,  and  vice  versa. 
Figure  2 plots  annual  observations  of the  marginal 
indicator  (solid  line),  that  is, the  difference  between 
the  rate  of growth  of nominal  output  and  the  com- 
mercial  paper  rate.  It also plots  c/zanges  in the  average 
indicator  Ayp (shaded  line),  that  is,  changes  in  the 
predicted  rate  of  growth  of  aggregate  nominal 
expenditure.  (The  shaded  line  in  Figure  2  shows 
first  differences  of  the  shaded  line  in  Figure  1.) 
The  positive  correlation  between  the  series  shown 
in  Figure  2  indicates  that  the  Fed  can  increase 
temporarily  the  difference  between  the  market  rate 
of return  on  capital  and  the  market  rate  of interest 
7 The  rate  of  interest  in  the  money  market  is  largely  deter- 
mined  by the  level of the  funds  rate,  which  since  the  early  1970s 
the  Fed  has  either  targeted  directly  or  indirectly  through 
setting  the  discount  rate  and  the  level  of  borrowed  reserves. 
Before  the  197Os, the  Fed  used  the  combination  of the  discount 
rate  and  free reserves  (excess  reserves  minus  borrowed  reserves) 
to  target  the  level  of  money  market  rates. 
by  allowing  the  rate  of growth  of aggregate  nominal 
expenditure  to  increase,  and  conversely.8 
Figure  3 displays  quarterly  observations  of the  two 
components  of the  marginal  monetary  indicator:  the 
annualized  rate  of growth  of nominal  output  and  the 
short-term  rate  of interest.  It also  shows  peaks  and 
troughs  of the  business  cycle.  Figure  3 suggests  that 
the  Fed  has  raised  the  level  of  short-term  rates 
relative  to the  rate  of growth  of nominal  output  over 
recovery  phases  of the  business  cycle  until the  thrust 
of monetary  policy became  restrictive.  With a lag after 
the  decline  in the  growth  of nominal  output,  it then 
lowered  the  level  of short-term  rates  until  the  thrust 
of  monetary  policy  became  expansionary. 
Figure  3 shades  in positive  differences  between  the 
rate  of growth  of nominal  output  and the  short-term 
interest  rate.  Until  1980,  during  periods  of economic 
recovery,  the  rate  of  growth  of  nominal  output 
exceeded  the  short-term  interest  rate.  In the  198Os, 
the  economy’s  underlying  real  rate  of interest  rose 
above  its historical  average.  In the  1980s  therefore, 
a higher  level  of short-term  rates  (relative  to nominal 
GDP  growth)  was  required  to  maintain  a given  rate 
of growth  of  nominal  expenditure.9 
It is possible  that  in the  1990s  the  economy’s  real 
rate of interest  has fallen back  to its longer-run,  lower 
level.lO  One  possible  explanation  for  the  recent 
weakness  in  the  growth  of  nominal  expenditure  is 
that  a fall in  the  economy’s  real  rate  of  interest  to 
8 For  the  period  1950  to  1979,  there  is  a positive  correlation 
like  that  shown  in  Figure  2 between  the  difference  in the  rate 
of growth  of nominal  output  and  the  commercial  paper  rate  and 
chances  in  the  rate  of  erowth  of  Ml.  Ml  is  a  oarticularlv 
interesting  monetary  agg;kgate  over  the  period  195’0 to  1979. 
Because  market  rates  were  relatively  high  and  demand  deposits 
could  not  pay  explicit  interest,  individuals  used  Ml  primarily 
as  a  transactions  vehicle.  For  this  reason,  the  interest  sensi- 
tivity  of real  Ml  demand  was  low.  As  a consequence,  quantity 
changes  in M 1 served  as a good  proxy  for the  effect  of monetary 
policy  actions  on  the  rate  of  growth  of  nominal  expenditure. 
Unlike  M2,  to  use  Ml  as  an  indicator  for  this  period,  it is not 
necessary  to  adjust  for  velocity  changes  due  to  changes  in 
interest  rates. 
9 The  difference  between  GNP  growth  and the  commercial  paper 
rate  was  3.3  from  1951  to  1960.  2.0  from  1961  to  1970.  2.7 
from  1971  to  1980,  but  -1.7  from  1981  to  1990. 
10  The  merchandise  trade  deficit  provides  indirect  evidence. 
It  averaged  about  .5  oercent  of GDP  in  the  1970s.  It  climbed 
sharply  in the  1980s  ;o  a level  of 3.6  percent  of GDP  in  1986. 
It  began  to  fall after  1987  and  was  about  1.5  percent  of GDP 
in  1991.  The  trade  deficit  is the  mirror  image  of capital  inflows. 
The  high  real  rate  of return  to  capital  in  the  United  States  in 
the  1980s  produced  capital  inflows  that  appeared  as  a  trade 
deficit.  The  reduction  in  the  trade  deficit  and  the  associated 
reduction  in capital  inflows  suggests  that  the  real rate  of interest 
in the  United  States  is returning  to a lower,  more  normal  level. 







Figure  1 
ACTUAL  AND  PREDICTED  NOMINAL  OUTPUT  GROWTH 
Wp  Predicted 
1921  26  31  36  41  46  51  56  61  66  71  76  81  86  91 
Notes:  Predictions  of  nominal  output  growth  are  from  the  M2  indicator  variable  Am  +  Avp,  where  Am  is  the  percentage  growth  in  M2 
and  Avp  is  the  predicted  percentage  growth  in  M2  velocity  due  to  changes  in  the  financial  market  opportunity  cost  of  holding  M2. 
Actual  nominal  output  growth  is  the  percentage  change  in  GNP  before  1959  and  GDP  thereafter. 
Figure  2 
DIFFERENCE  BETWEEN RATES OF  RETURN  ON  PHYSICAL  AND  FINANCIAL  ASSETS; 








Nominal  Output  Growth  Minus  Paper  Rate 
pe  Change  in  Predicted  Growth 
of  Nominal  Output 
$ 
,I,,  I,,,  ,,,I  IIII,,,,  ,,I,  ,,,,I,I,,  ,,,I  ,,I,  I,,,  (,,,  ,,,,I,,,,(,,,, 
1921  26  31  36.  41  46  51  56  61  66  71  76  81  86  91 
Notes:  The  solid  line  is  the  difference  between  nominal  output  growth  (GNP  before  1959  and  GDP  thereafter)  and  the  four-  to  six-month 
commercial  paper  rate.  The  shaded  line  is the  change  in  predicted  growth  of  aggregate  nominal  output.  That  is,  it  is first  differences 
of  the  sum  of  the  percentage  growth  in  M2  and  the  predicted  percentage  growth  in  velocity  (first  differences  of  the  shaded  line 
in  Figure  1). 
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Growth  in  Nominal  Output  ------.-.....~~.~  Money  Market  Rate 
Notes:  Nominal  output  growth  is  quarterly  observations  of  four-quarter  rates  of  growth  of  nominal  output  (GNP  before  1959  and  GDP 
thereafter).  Money  market  rate  is  the  three-month  Treasury  bill  rate  for  1947-1963  and  the  funds  rate  thereafter.  The  graph  shades 
in  the  positive  differences  in  these  two  series.  Js  mark  business  cycle  troughs  and  Ps peaks.  Heavy  tick  marks  indicate  last  quarter 
of  year. 
a more  normal  historical  level  has  made  it  difficult 
for  the  Fed  to  find  the  level  of  short-term  market 
rates  consistent  with  this  rate.  The  funds  rates  in the 
3 to 4 percent  range  that  prevailed  in  199 1 and  1992 
seemed  low relative  to the  funds  rate  peak  of almost 
10 percent  in  1989.  Figure  3, however,  suggests  that 
these  funds  rates  were  low  only  relative  to  the 
unusually  high  rates  of  the  1980s.  As  shown  in 
Figure  3,  relative  to  the  rate  of  growth  of  nominal 
GDP  in business  cycle  recoveries  before  the  1980s 
the  funds  rate  has  not  been  low  in  the  current 
recovery. 
C.  Inverse  Movements  in  M2  and 
M2  Velocity 
M2  is not  widely  used  as an  indicator  of  the  im- 
pact  of  monetary  policy  actions  on  the  growth  of 
nominal  expenditure.  The  reason  may  be  the  low 
contemporaneous  correlation  between  the  rates  of 
growth  of M2  and nominal  expenditure.”  The  reason 
‘I  For  example,  from  first  quarter  1965 through  second  quarter 
199’2, the  correlation  between  quarterly  growth  rates  of M2  and 
nominal  GDP  was  .31.  This  correlation,  however,  mostly 
for  this  low  contemporaneous  correlation  is  that 
movements  in interest  rates  initially  produce  inverse 
movements  in  M2  and  its  velocity. 
This  inverse  relationship  is produced  by  the  in- 
ertia  in the  rates  paid  on many  of the  deposits  in M2 
relative  to money  market  rates.  Until June  1978,  with 
the  issuance  of money  market  certificates  by  S&Ls, 
all the  deposits  in M2  were  either  subject  to  Reg  Q 
ceilings  or  to  the  outright  prohibition  of  interest 
payments.  Even  with  the  complete  phase-out  of 
Reg  Q  in  1986,  banks  continue  to  vary  the  rates 
paid  on  many  of  the  components  of  M’2 (NOWs, 
MMDAs,  and  savings  deposits)  sluggishly.  As  a 
consequence,  when  market  rates  rise,  the  cost  of 
holding  M’2 rises,  and  depositors  move  out  of  M2 
into  other  financial  instruments  like  large  CDs. 
Although  M2  growth  falls,  M’Z  velocity  growth  rises 
because  M2  has  become  more  costly  to  hold.  As a 
consequence,  a  macroeconomic  shock  that  causes 
reflected  a common  trend.  When  the  growth  rates  are differenced 
to  remove  trend.  the  correlation  between  M’2 and  GDP  falls to 
.044.  There  is almost  no contemporaneous  relationship  between 
changes  in  the  growth  rates  of  M2  and  nominal  GDP. 
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associated  with  a  decline  in  M2  growth,  and  con- 
versely.  l2 Casual  observation  then  suggests  that  M’Z 
offers  little  information  about  the  behavior  of 
expenditure. 
Figure  4  shows  annual  observations  of  rates  of 
growth  of M’Z and  the  financial  market  opportunity 
cost  of holding  M2  (the commercial  paper  rate  minus 
the  own  rate  of return  on  MZ).  There  is an  inverse 
cyclical  relationship  between  the  rate  of growth  of 
M2  and the  cost  of holding  M2.  Consequently,  there 
is an inverse  cyclical relationship  between  M2 growth 
and  M2  velocity  growth.  This  inverse  relationship 
means  that  often  the  contemporaneous  behavior  of 
M2  does  not  give good  signals  about  the  contempo- 
raneous  rate  of  growth  of  nominal  output.  More 
generally,  cyclical movements  in nominal  expenditure 
12  It  follows  that  strength  in  economic  activity  is  initially 
associated  with  a  reduction  in  M2  growth  and  weakness  in 
economic  activity  is initially  associated  with  an  increase  in M2 
growth.  M2  targeting  then  would  appear  to  conflict  with  lean- 
against-the-wind  procedures  that  call for a rise  in the  funds  rate 
when  economic  activity  strengthens  and  a  fall  when  economic 
activity  weakens.  This  conflict  is  probably  one  of  the  reasons 
for  the  relative  insignificance  of  M’2 in  popular  discussions  of 
monetary  policy.  A substantive  target  for M’2 would  provide  for 
a short-term  negative  elasticity  of supply  with  respect  to market 
rates,  but  would  eliminate  long-term  base  drift  in  light  of  the 
stability  of  M2  velocity. 
Figure  4 
M2  GROWTH  AND  FINANCIAL  MARKET 
OPPORTUNITY  COST  OF  HOLDING  M2 







M2  Growth  (left  scale)  -  1 
-Opportunity  Cost  (right  scale) 
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Notes:  Annual  observations  of  percentage  change  in  M2.  The 
financial  market  opportunity  cost  of  holding  M2  is  the 
difference  between  the  four-  to  six-month  commercial 
paper  rate  and  a  weighted  average  of  the  explicit  rates  of 
return  paid  on  the  components  of  M2. 
are  largely  accounted  for  by  cyclical  movements  in 
M2  velocity  rather  than  in  M2. 
This  pattern  can be  seen  in recent  years.  In  1987, 
market  rates  rose  absolutely  and  relative  to the  rates 
paid  on  M2  components  like  NOWs,  savings 
deposits,  and  MMDAs;  consequently,  the  rate  of 
growth  of M2 fell. This  fall, however,  was more  than 
offset  by  a rise  in M2  velocity  produced  by  the  in- 
creased  cost  of holding  real M2.  In  1987,  therefore, 
the  rate  of growth  of ML?  fell,  even  though  the  rate 
of  growth  of  nominal  GDP  rose.  These  inverse 
movements  in M2  and  in its velocity,  however,  are 
transitory.  Sustairied  changes  in the  rate  of growth 
of  M2  ultimately  produce  changes  in  the  rate  of 
growth  of  nominal  output.  The  financial  market 
opportunity  cost  of  holding  M’Z stopped  rising  in 
1989  and  began  to  fall.  In  the  absence  of  rising 
velocity,  low M2 growth  then  began  to show  through 
to  weakness  in  the  growth  of  nominal  output. 
IV.  ARGUMENTS THAT  M2  DEMAND 
WILLBEUNSTABLE 
In the  195Os, as in the  present,  many  economists 
argued  that  the growing  importance  of nonbank  finan- 
cial  intermediation  would  make  money  demand 
unstable.  Similar  predictions  of  instability  in  the 
demand  for money  were  made  in the  early  1960s with 
the  appearance  of  credit  cards,  in  the  late  1960s 
with  the  emergence  of  the  Eurodollar  market,  in 
the  mid-1970s  with  new  cash  management  tech- 
niques,  and  in  the  1980s  with  securitization.  The 
long-term  stability  of M2  velocity  has  contradicted 
these  predictions.  At  present,  however,  the  over- 
prediction  of real  M2  pointed  out  in  Section  II has 
revived  such  fears.  This  section  examines  five 
arguments  made  recently  suggesting  that  M2  demand 
will  be  unstable  in  the  future. 
A.  Bond  Funds 
The  current  weakness  in real  M2  growth  is’often 
attributed  to a shift  of deposits  out  of M2  into  bond 
funds  prompted  by  a  sharply  rising  yield  curve.  It 
is uncertain,  however,  whether  the  magnitude  of such 
transfers  is sufficient  to explain  much  of the  weakness 
in  real  M2.  It  is  true  that  in  1992  the  yield  curve 
has  been  unusually  steep.  Weakness  in  real  M2 
growth,  however,  developed  before  the  appearance 
of  a  yield  spread  large  by  the  standards  of  the 
18  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER  1992 1980s.13 Also,  the  5 percentage  point  change  in the 
yield  spread  from  a  -  2 in the  early  1980s  to  a  +3 
in  198.5  did  not  destabilize  M2  demand.  More 
generally,  over  the  post-World  War  II  period,  the 
demand  for real M2 has not been  significantly affected 
by  the  shape  of  the  yield  curve. 
Also,  the  previous  experience  with  strong  growth 
in bond  funds  did not weaken  real M2  demand.  Bond 
funds  increased  about  $250  billion from  1985 to early 
1987.  (A strong  rally in the bond  market  made  bonds 
attractive  during  this  period.  The  30-year  bond  rate 
fell  from  11.4  percent  in July  1984  to  7.4  percent 
in September  1986,  a decline  of 4 percentage  points.) 
In  198.5  and  1986,  however,  M2  grew  rapidly  at 
about  an  8 percent  annualized  rate. 
If all of the  assets  of bond  funds  were  included  in 
M2,  this  augmented  monetary  aggregate  would  still 
have  grown  only  moderately  recently.  For  example, 
from  fourth  quarter  1990  through  fourth  quarter 
1991,  M2  grew  at  2.9  percent  while  M2  plus  bond 
funds  grew  at  5.6  percent.  It  is,  however,  unlikely 
that  all  of  the  growth  in  bond  funds  came  at  the 
expense  of  M2  deposits.  It  is  not  plausible  that 
individuals  view  the  deposits  in ML? as  highly  sub- 
stitutable  with  bond  funds.  The  value  of  assets  in 
M2  is  not  subject  to  fluctuation  as  market  rates 
change,  while  the  value  of bond  funds  is.  Further- 
more,  those  bond  funds  that  could  be  defended  as 
substitutes  for M2,  namely,  short-term  bond  funds, 
have  hardly  grown.  The  amount  of money  in bond 
funds  with  bonds  of maturity  five years  or less,  about 
$20  billion  at  the  end  of  1991,  is  small  compared 
to the  amount  of M2,  $3,438.9  billion  in December 
1991.14 
B.  Unwinding  Debt  with  M2 
Some  economists  have  argued  that  weakness  in 
real M2  growth  is due  to the  repayment  of consumer 
debt.  They  argue  that  individuals  experienced  an 
adverse  wealth  shock  in the  late  1980s  that  has made 
them  want  to hold  less  debt.  The  ratio  of consumer 
13 As  measured  by the  difference  between  the  30-year  Treasury 
bond  r’ate and  the  six-month  commercial  paper  rate,  the  yield 
spread  averaged  about  2 percentage  points  from first quarter  1983 
to  second  quarter  1988.  After  becoming  relatively  flat in  1989, 
it began  to  rise  again  and  reached  2 percentage  points  again  in 
the  middle  of  1991.  It  then  rose  to  about  4 percentage  points 
in  third  quarter  1992. 
r4 The  figures  on bond  funds  are from  the  Investment  Company 
Institute.  The  figures  on  short-term  bond  funds  were  kindly 
assembled  by Anne  Schafer  at the  Investment  Company  Institute 
from  individual  fund  data  from  Lipper  Analytical  Securities. 
debt  to household  net worth  rose  from  about  15 per- 
cent  in the  1970s  to  a peak  of 21  percent  in  1991. 
(Consumer  debt  comprises  primarily  installment 
credit  and  mortgages.  Household  net  worth  is  the 
difference  between  the  assets  and  liabilities  of 
households.)  According  to the  argument,  consumers 
are  now  reducing  their  debt  by  drawing  down 
deposits  in  M’Z. 
Figure  5  shows  real  household  net  worth 
(household  net  worth  deflated  by the  CPI).  Although 
by  this  measure  the  increase  in the  public’s  wealth 
slowed  in  the  late  198Os,  previous  recessions  also 
exhibited  such  slowdowns.  The  recent  behavior  of 
wealth  does  not  suggest  anything  unusual  about  the 
last recession.  Some  commentators  have  referred  to 
a  decline  in  the  value  of  the  housing  stock.  As 
measured  by  the  index  constructed  by  the  National 
Association  of Realtors  (median  sales price  of existing 
single-family  homes),  the  sales  price  of  existing 
homes  did  fall in  1990,  after  having  risen  in  1988 
and  1989  at  a  rate  of  about  5  percent.  In  1991, 
however,  home  prices  rose at about  an 8 percent  rate. 
Figure  6  shows  the  behavior  of  household  debt 
over  recent  business  cycles  (Schreft  and  Owens, 
1991).  Household  debt  (deflated  by the  CPI)  is put 
into  the  form  of  a  cycle-relative  index  for  each 
business  cycle  by  dividing  quarterly  debt  figures  by 
the  value  of  debt  six  quarters  preceding  the  cycle 
peak.  Figure  6  shows  that  in the  recent  cycle  con- 
sumer  debt  did rise  prior  to the  cycle  peak.  At least 
as  of first  quarter  1992,  however,  it  has  not  fallen 
since  the  cycle  peak  as  predicted  by  the  debt- 
unwinding  hypothesis.  (In the  recession  that  began 
in  fourth  quarter  1973,  real  household  debt  did 
fall,  but  the  demand  for  M2  was  not  rendered 
unpredictable.) 
The  appeal  of the  debt-unwinding  hypothesis  may 
derive  in part  from  a natural  tendency  to generalize 
about  collective  behavior  on  the  basis  of individual 
behavior.  An individual who  lowers  his debt  will draw 
on  savings  and  reduce  consumption.  It  therefore 
appears  plausible  to  explain  both  the  current 
weakness  in real M2 growth  and  in real expenditure 
by  an  excessive  debt  level.  However,  what  is true 
for the  individual  is not  necessarily  true  for  individ- 
uals  collectively.  One  person’s  debt  is another  per- 
son’s  asset.  If debts  are  high,  so  are  assets.  In  the 
aggregate,  the  level  of debt  does  not  affect  the  level 
of wealth.  Economic  theory  says that  consumers  will 
proportion  their  holdings  of M2  to  their  total  finan- 
cial wealth,  which  in the  aggregate  is not  affected  by 
debt  creation.  The  ratio  of household  net  financial 
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Figure  5 
REAL  M2  AND  REAL  HOUSEHOLD  NET  WORTH 
Real  Net  Worth  (left  scale)  ----  Real  M2  (right  scale) 
Notes:  M2  and  household  net  worth  are  deflated  by  the  CPI  and  are  in  1982  dollars.  Household  net  worth  is  from  the  Federal  Reserve 
Board  of  Governors,  Flow  of  Funds  Accounts,  “Balance  Sheets  for  the  U.S.  Economy.”  Ts mark  business  cycle  troughs  and  Ps peaks. 













wealth  to  disposable  personal  income  has  grown 
moderately  ever  since  the  mid-1970s.15  It  has 
not  exhibited  any  drops  over  the  last  several  years 
that  could  have  caused  a  reduction  in  the  public’s 
demand  for  M2. 
Similarly,  it  does  not  follow  that  aggregate  ex- 
penditure  will fall when  an individual  consumes  less 
to  reduce  his  debt.  Nothing  has  changed  to  cause 
that  individual  to  work  less;  he  may  even  work 
harder.  He  will  save  more.  In  the  aggregate,  con- 
sumption  will fall, but  saving  and  investment  will in- 
crease.  The  increase  in investment  will maintain  the 
level  of  aggregate  expenditure. 
The  behavior  of the  savings  rate  contradicts  the 
implication  of the  debt-unwinding  hypothesis  that  the 
savings  rate  should  be  unusually  high.  As measured 
‘5  Household  net  financial  wealth  is  the  difference  between 
“Total  Financial  Assets”  and  “Total  Liabilities”  for households 
in  the  table  “Financial  Assets  and  Liabilities,  Outstandings,” 
from  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  of Governors  Flow  of Funds 
Accounts.  Disposable  personal  income  is  from  the  National 
Income  and  Product  Accounts.  . 
by  the  National  Income  and  Product  Accounts,  the 
savings  rate  has  not  risen  but  has  remained  around 
a  relatively  low  level  of  5  percent. 
If individuals  have  experienced  an adverse  wealth 
shock,  they  would  want  to  rebuild  their  wealth  by 
saving  more.  Their  demand  for M2,  which  is a com- 
ponent  of  wealth,  should  increase,  not  decrease. 
It  has,  however,  been  argued  that  consumers  are 
using  M2  balances  to  draw  down  consumer  install- 
ment  debt  because  the  return  paid  on  M2  balances 
has  fallen  relative  to  the  cost  of  installment  credit. 
In  particular,  the  rate  paid  on  a  three-month  bank 
CD  has  fallen  from  a peak  of somewhat  more  than 
10 percent  in March  1989  to 3.3  percent  in August 
1992,  while  the  cost  of using  a credit  card  has often 
remained  around  18  percent.  This  argument, 
however,  assumes  that  the  same  individuals  hold 
bank  CDs  and  credit  cards.  Even  when  CD  rates 
were  at their  peak,  it is hard  to  understand  why  the 
same  individual  would  borrow  at  18 percent  while 
lending  at  10  percent.  l6 
r6 Robert  Laurent  made  this  point  in personal  correspondence. 
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THE  CYCLICAL  BEHAVIOR  OF  REAL HOUSEHOLD  DEBT 
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Notes:  Credit  market  debt  owed  by  households  is  deflated  by  the  CPI.  Debt  is  put  into  cycle-relative  form  by  dividing  by  the  value  of 
debt  six  quarters  prior  to  the  cycle  peak.  Dates  by  lines  indicate  the  particular  business  cycle  peak.  Household  debt  is  from  the 
table  “Credit  Market  Debt  Owed  by  Nonfinancial  Sectors,  Households,”  from  Federal  Reserve  Board  of  Governors,  Flow  of 
Funds  Accounts,  “Financial  Assets  and  Liabilities,  Outstandings.” 
C.  The  Shrinking  Thrift  Industry 
Some  economists  have  argued  that  closings  of 
thrifts  by the  Resolution  Trust  Corporation  (RTC) 
begun  in 1989  have  produced  slow real  M2  growth 
(Duca,  1992;  Kasriel,  1991).  Actually,  the  ratio  of 
thrift  deposits  to total M2 declined  more  sharply  over 
the  period  1979  through  198’2 (about  7.5  percent- 
age points)  than  over  the  period  1989  through  1992 
(about  5.5  percentage  points).  The  earlier  runoff  in 
thrift  deposits  was  not,  however,  associated  with  an 
unpredictable  reduction  in the  public’s  demand  for 
real  M2. 
Closing  a thrift  does  not  directly  affect  the  money 
stock.  At an aggregate  level, closing an insolvent thrift 
involves  replacing  a bad  asset  (a real  estate  loan  in 
default)  on the  books  of financial intermediaries  with 
a good  asset  (a Treasury  bill).  This  transaction  in- 
volves  a  wealth  transfer  from  taxpayers  to  thrift 
depositors.  It  does  not,  however,  reduce  the  total 
assets  of financial intermediaries  and, therefore,  need 
not  affect  total  deposits. 
There  may,  however,  be  an  indirect  effect  on 
the  money  stock.  Because  the  NOW  accounts  of  a 
failed  thrift  are  simply  transferred  to  the  acquiring 
institution,  these  deposits  are  not  lost  to M2.  When 
the  RTC  closes  a thrift,  however,  it may  retain  some 
of  the  thrift’s  assets.  It  will fund  these  assets  with 
government  debt,  rather  than  with  the  high-yielding 
brokered  deposits  formerly  used  by  the  thrift.  The 
former  holders  of these  brokered  deposits  may then 
move  into government  debt.  In this case,  the  decline 
in brokered  deposits  measures  the  decline  in M2. 
Figure  7 shows  the  brokered  deposits  of thrifts  and 
commercial  banks  included  in ML?. Over  the  period 
of RTC  closures,  the  decrease  in brokered  deposits 
at thrifts minus the  increase  in these  deposits  at banks 
gives  a rough  estimate  of  the  reduction  in M’Z that 
could  have  arisen  from  RTC  actions.  From  second 
quarter  1989,  which  marked  the  peak  in brokered 
deposits  held by thrifts,  to the  fourth  quarter  of  199 1, 
the  combined  holdings  of  thrifts  and  banks  fell  by 
$40.3  billion.  This  figure  is  small  relative  to  ML?. 
As  of  fourth  quarter  1991,  $40.3  billion  was  only 
1.2 percent  of M2.  Finally, because  of a lack of funds, 
the  RTC  stopped  closing insolvent  thrifts  after March 
1992.  The  absence  of thrift  closures,  however,  did 
not  produce  any  revival  in ML? growth. 
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Notes:  The  solid  line  is  brokered  deposits  included  in  M2  held 
by  S&Ls  and  SAIF-insured  mutual  savings  banks.  The 
shaded  line  is brokered  deposits  held  by  commercial  banks 
and  FDIC-insured  mutual  savings  banks.  Data  are  from  call 
reports.  Heavy  tick  marks  indicate  last  quarter  of  year. 
Notes:  Velocity  is gross  domestic  product  divided  by  M2.  Adjusted 
M2  is  M2  minus  CDs  of  less  than  $100,000.  Heavy  tick 
marks  indicate  last  quarter  of  year. 
E.  Divergent  Growth  in  Ml  and  M2 
D.  The  Runoff  in  Small  CDs 
Much  of the  weakness  in real M2  growth  has been 
associated  with  the  runoff  of small  retail  CDs  (CDs 
less  than  $100,000).  Some  economists  have  argued 
that  small  CDs  are  “a  source  of  instability  in  the 
supply  and demand  for M2” (Wenninger  and  Partlan, 
1992,  p.  34;  Citibank,  1992).  The  concentration  of 
weakness  in M2 growth  in small CDs,  however,  does 
not  in itself  imply  that  the  public’s  demand  for  M2 
demand  has  declined.  It  is  also  consistent  with  a 
change  in  M2  from  the  supply  side. 
Over  the  two-year  period  August  1990  through 
August  1992,  the  annualized  growth  rates  of Ml  and 
M2 were,  respectively,  9.2  percent  and  2.3  percent. 
Some  have argued  that this divergence  in growth  rates 
indicates  instability  in  the  M2  demand  function. 
There  is,  however,  a  ready  explanation  for  this 
divergence.  With  the  nationwide  introduction  of 
NOW  accounts  in  198 1,  real  Ml  demand  became 
sensitive  to market  rates  (Hetzel  and  Mehra,  1989). 
The  recent  strength  in Ml  growth  reflects  a fall in 
market  rates  that  has  decreased  the  cost  of holding 
real  Ml  and  increased  its  demand. 
Assume,  for  example,  that  the  central  bank  has 
kept  the  market  rate  of interest  above  the  economy’s 
equilibrium  rate,  so  that  banks  are  reducing  their 
assets.  As they  reduce  their  assets,  they  will reduce 
their  deposit  liabilities  in the  least-cost  way.  Banks 
buy  and  sell CDs  (large  and  small)  in a spot  market. 
In contrast,  their  other  deposits  generally  involve  a 
long-term  customer  relationship.  The  least-cost  way 
for banks  to reduce  their  liabilities  is to let CDs  run 
off  by  lowering  the  rate  they  pay  on  them. 
Figure  8 shows  velocity  for  M2,  as  well  as  for  a 
revised  M’Z defined  as M2  less  small  CDs.  Velocity 
fluctuates  less with  the  current  definition  of M2  than 
with  a definition  excluding  small  CDs.  Money  de- 
mand  regressions  using  M2  minus  small  CDs  also 
exhibit  a  significantly  poorer  fit  than  regressions 
using  the  current  definition  of  M2. 
Figure  9  shows  Ml  velocity  and  the  financial 
market  opportunity  cost of holding  M 1 (the difference 
between  the  commercial  paper  rate  and  a weighted 
average  of the explicit rates  of return  paid on the  com- 
ponents  of Ml).  The  graph  starts  in  1982  to  avoid 
the  distorting  effects  of the  nationwide  introduction 
of NOWs  in  1981.  As  shown,  Ml  velocity  is  sen- 
sitive  to  interest  rates.  Over  the  1980s  the  fall  in 
the  cost  of holding  Ml  has  been  associated  with  a 
fall  in  Ml  velocity  (a  rise  in  real  M 1  demand). 
During  the  two periods  when  the  cost  of holding  M 1 
rose,  1984  and  1987-1989,  Ml  velocity  ceased 
falling. 
Because  banks  reduce  the  rates  paid  on NOW  ac- 
counts  only with  a lag as market  rates  fall, reductions 
in market  rates  make  holding  NOW  accounts  more 
attractive.  Also,  when  market  rates  fall, corporations 
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hold  a higher  level  of demand  deposits  as compen- 
sating  balances  to  reimburse  banks  for  various  ser- 
vices.  Reductions  in market  rates  then  increase  the 
demand  for  M 1. When  market  rates  fell beginning 
in  the  summer  of  1984,  Ml  growth  surged.  Ml 
growth  reached  12 percent  and  16 percent  in  1985 
and  1986,  respectively.  These  rates  of growth  of M 1 
did  not  raise  the  inflation  rate  because  they  accom- 
modated  an increased  demand  for Ml.  Similarly,  at 
present,  high  Ml  growth  rates  are  accommodating 
an  increased  demand  for  Ml  produced  by  the  fall 
in  market  rates. 
Increased  Ml  growth  in  turn  leads  to  an  in- 
creased  demand  for  reserves  because  of  the  10 
percent  reserve  requirement  imposed  on  demand 
deposits  and NOW  accounts.  At the  prevailing  funds 
rate,  the  Fed  accommodates  the  increased  demand 
for reserves  and  the  rate  of growth  of bank  reserves 
and the monetary  base  increases.  Higher  growth  rates 
of bank  reserves  and  the  base,  however,  do  not  in 
themselves  indicate  that  monetary  policy  actions  are 
expansionary. 
V. CONCLUDINGCOMMENT 
Forecasters  have  had more  than  the usual problems 
in recent  years.  For  example,  in its  lead-off  section 
entitled  “End  of Recession  Has  Arrived  on Schedule,” 
the July  10, 199 1, Bhe  Ch;P Economic Indicate  (199 1) 
reported  consensus  forecasts  for  third  and  fourth 
quarter  1991  growth  in real GNP  of 2.7  percent  and 
2.9  percent,  respectively.  The  actual  growth  rates, 
however,  were  significantly  lower  (1 .O and  .4  per- 
cent,  respectively).  The  forecasters  who  contributed 
to  these  consensus  forecasts  also  ranked  as  the 
second  most  important  factor  in promoting  economic 
growth  “easier  monetary  policy  resulting  from  more 
accommodative  action  by the  Federal  Reserve,”  that 
is,  reductions  in the  funds  rate.  It now  appears  that 
most  forecasters  were  again  too  optimistic  in  the 
spring  of  1992  in  forecasting  growth  over  the  last 
part  of  1992.  This  article  suggests  that  forecasters 
would  have done  better  by using the  information  con- 
tained  in  the  behavior  of M2. 
This  article  has  proposed  two  related  indicators 
of the  impact  of monetary  policy  actions  on growth 
of aggregate  nominal  expenditure.  One,  an average 
indicator,  measures  the  combined  impact  of the  rate 
of growth  of M2  and the rate of growth  of ML?  velocity 
produced  by  contemporaneous  and  past  changes  in 
the  cost  of holding  M2.  The  other,  a marginal  indi- 
cator,  measures  the  impact  of  contemporaneous 
policy actions  on this average  indicator.  The  marginal 
indicator  is the  difference  between  the  rate of growth 
of nominal  output  (a proxy  for  the  rate  of return  on 
physical  assets)  and  a  short-term  interest  rate.  A 
large  value  for  this  indicator  is  associated  with  in- 
creases  in  the  rate  of growth  of  aggregate  nominal 
expenditure  predicted  by the  average  indicator,  and 
conversely. 
Over  the  last  two years,  the  rates  of growth  of M2 
and nominal  GDP  have  corresponded  fairly closely. 
From  second  quarter  1990  through  second  quarter 
1992,  nominal  GDP  and  M2,  respectively,  grew  at 
annualized  rates  of  3.3  percent  and  2.7  percent. 
Given  the  reduction  in the  cost  of holding  M2  due 
to the  fall in interest  rates  over  this period,  however, 
the  rate  of growth  of M2  should  have  exceeded  the 
rate  of growth  of nominal  GDP.  In  this  sense,  the 
public’s  demand  for real M2  has been  unpredictable. 
Whether  M2  conveys  useful  information  about  the 
nominal  expenditure  of the public,  however,  depends 
on the  magnitude  of unpredictable  changes  in the  de- 
mand  for real M2 relative to the  magnitude  of changes 
in the  other  determinants  of nominal  expenditure- 
changes  in nominal  M2  and  predictable  changes  in 
ML? velocity.  The  regression  analysis  of  Section  II 
indicates  that  recent  unpredictable  changes  in  the 
public’s  demand  for real M2  have  been  small relative 
to these  other  determinants.  In particular,  the  reduc- 
tion in the growth  rate of nominal  expenditure  reflects 
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an  unpredictable  increase  in  ML? velocity. 
The  relationship  between  money  and nominal  out- 
put  is  predictable  only  over  fairly  long  periods  of 
time.  Consequently,  inferences  about  the  contempo- 
raneous  behavior  of money  demand  are always prob- 
lematic.  For  this  reason,  Section  IV  examined  the 
plausibility  of various  reasons  advanced  for  believ- 
ing  that  M2  demand  is  behaving  unpredictably  at 
present.  Section  IV  examined  the  effects  on  real 
M2  demand  of bond  funds,  variability  in the  public’s 
demand  for  debt,  the  reduction  in  the  size  of  the 
thrift industry,  the reduction  in bank  holdings  of small 
CDs,  and  divergent  growth  rates  of  Ml  and  M2. 
None  of  these  phenomena  will  clearly  destabilize 
real  M2  demand.  It appears  likely  that  the  behavior 
of M2  will continue  to offer useful  information  about 
the  public’s  nominal  expenditure  and  output. 
APPENDIX 
One  way  to  appraise  the  stability  of  the  public’s 
demand  for  real  M2  is  to  observe  the  size  of  the 
errors  of an M2  demand  regression.  The  regression 
used  here  (1)  is similar  to  the  one  in Friedman  and 
Schwartz  (1982).  It is also interesting  in the  present 
context  because  its  use  of  percentage  changes  in 
nominal  output  as a regressor  measuring  the  market 
rate  of return  on  physical  assets  lends  credence  to 
the use of this variable as a component  of the marginal 
indicator  variable  advanced  in  Section  III. 
(1)  ‘In  (M2/P)t  =  co  +  clln  (GDP/P)t  - 
cz(Rt -  RM’&) -csAln  GDPt  +  et, 
where  M2  is per  capita  M2;  P  is the  implicit  price 
deflator  for  GDP  (GNP  before  1959);  GDP  is per 
capita  gross  domestic  product  (GNP  before  1959); 
R  is  the  four-  to  six-month  commercial  paper  rate 
and  RM2  is a weighted  average  of the  own  rates  of 
return  paid  on  components  of M2.  The  error  term 
is e. The  natural  logarithm  of a number  is indicated 
by  In  and  A  indicates  first  differences. 
An examination  of observations  of ML?  velocity  and 
(R -RMZ),  the  financial  market  opportunity  cost  of 
holding  real M’Z, suggests  a reduction  in the  interest 
elasticity  of real  M2  demand  after  1963.  The  large 
cycles  in  the  cost  of holding  M2  that  began  in  the 
mid-1960s  induced  relatively  moderate  changes  in 
M2  velocity  relative  to  the  earlier  period.  For  this 
reason,  (1) was  estimated  with  a shift dummy  on the 
financial  market  opportunity  cost  variable,  with  the 
dummy  assuming  the  value  one  from  1964  through 
1991  and  zero  otherwise. 
Tables  Al  and  A2  exhibit  regression  equation  (1) 
estimated  using  annual  observations,  respectively,  in 
levels  and  first  differences  over  the  period  19 1.5 to 
199 1. The  specification  differs  from  that  of Fried- 
man  and  Schwartz  (1982)  in  two  respects.  They 
assume  that  M2  pays  a market  rate  of return  apart 
from  the  fraction  held  in  the  form  of  noninterest- 
bearing  base  money,  H.  As a consequence,  they  use 
as their  opportunity  cost variable,  R( 1 -H/ML?).  That 
is, they  assume  that  banks  have  evaded  completely 
both  the  prohibition  of payment  of  interest  on  de- 
mand  deposits  and  Regulation  Q  ceilings.  Equation 
(1) employs  instead  (R -RMZ),  which  incorporates 
the  assumption  that  these  restrictions  were  binding. 
Second,  equation  (1)  omits  the  dummy  variables 
Friedman  and  Schwartz  use  to  capture  money  de- 
mand  shifts  during  the  Depression  and  World  War 
II and  after  World  Wars  I and  II.  It adds,  however, 
a shift  dummy  to capture  a reduction  in the  interest 
elasticity  of  real  ML? demand  beginning  in  the 
mid-1960s. 
Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1982)  use  data  averaged 
over phases  (contraction  or expansion)  of the  business 
cycle,  while  the  regressions  here  are  estimated  with 
annual  data.  Their  first  observation  is for  the  years 
1867  to  1869,  while  the  first  observation  used  here 
is for the  year  19 15. The  data  necessary  to estimate 
the  own  rate  on M2  (RMZ),  which  are  used  to con- 
struct  the  financial  market  opportunity  cost  variable, 
only  become  available  in 19 15. It is necessary  to use 
annual  observations  because  this variable  can be con- 
structed  quarterly  only  beginning  in the  first  quarter 
of  1946. 
The’parameter  values yielded  by estimation  in level 
form  and  in  first-differenced  form  are  comparable. 
Granger  and  Newbold  (1974)  point  out  that  regres- 
sion  equations  like the  one  in Table  Al  that  possess 
a nonstationary  dependent  variable  and  serially  cor- 
related  errors  (as evidenced  by a low Durbin-Watson 
statistic)  can yield  misleading  inferences.  After  their 
work,  money  demand  regressions  were  generally 
estimated  in  first-differenced  form.  First  differenc- 
ing,  however,  results  in a loss  of information  in the 
data.  For  these  reasons,  recent  work  has used  error- 
correction  models  that  combine  estimation  in levels 
and first differences.  [See Engle  and  Granger  (1987), 
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M2  Demand  Regression,  1915 to  1991 
In  rM2,  =  4.6  +  .95  I?  rGDP,  -  7.4  (R,-RM2J  -  .54  Ah  GDP,  +  6, 
t.2)  (46.0)  (12.7)  (7.0) 
Dummy  on  (R,-RM2J  =  5.1  (7.2) 
CRSQ  =  .98  SEE  =  5.5  DW  =  .98  DF  =  72 
rM2  is  per  capita  M2  deflated  by  the  implicit  GNP  deflator  before  1959  and  by  the  GDP 
deflator  thereafter;  rGDP  is  real  per  capita  gross  national  product  before  1959  and  real 
per  capita  gross  domestic  product  thereafter;  R  is the  four-  to  six-month  commercial  paper 
rate  expressed  as  a  decimal;  RM2  is  a  weighted  average  of  the  own  rates  of  return  paid 
on  components  of  M2;  and  GDP  is nominal  gross  national  product  before  1959  and  gross 
domestic  product  thereafter.  In  is the  natural  logarithm  and  A the  first-difference  operator. 
The  zero-one  multiplicative  shift  dummy  on  (R,-  RM2,)  is  one  from  1964  to  1991  and 
zero  otherwise. 
CRSQ  is the  corrected  R-squared;  SEE  the  standard  error  of estimate;  DW  the  Durbin-Watson 
statistic;  and  DF  degrees  of  freedom.  Absolute  values  of  t-statistics  are  in  parentheses. 
Estimation  is  by  OLS.  Before  1959,  M2  is  M4  in  Table  1  of  Friedman  and  Schwartz 
(1970).  From  1915  to  1929,  GNP  is  from  Balke  and  Gordon  (1989). 
Table  A2 
M2  Demand  Regression,  First  Differences,  1918 to  1991 
Aln  rM2,  =  1.0  Aln  rGDP,  -  6.6  A(R,-RM2J  -  .95  A21n  GDP,  +  it 
(6.9)  (11.3) 
Dummy  on  (R,-RM2J  =  3.9  (3.6) 
CRSQ  =  .79  SEE  =  2.4  DW  =  1.4  DF  =  66 
Notes:  A2 is the  second-difference  operator.  The  sum  of  the  estimated  coefficients  (and  absolute 
value  of  its  t-statistic)  is shown.  Sum  of  coefficients  on  rGDP  constrained  to  sum  to  one. 
Estimated  coefficients  on  the  contemporaneous  and  lagged  terms  (absolute  value  of 
t-statistics  in  parentheses)  are  as  follows: 
lag  Aln  rGDP,  A(R,-  RM2,)  A*ln  GDP, 
0  .83  (13.0)  -  2.47  (6.2)  -  .46  (8.2) 
1  .17  (2.7)  -  2.50  (5.9)  -  .36  (9.4) 
2  -  1.65  (3.9)  -.13  (3.6) 
The  estimated  coefficient  on  the  multiplicative  shift  dummy  on  A(R,-  RM2,)  was  con- 
strained  to  assume  the  same  value  at  each  lag.  Otherwise,  see  notes  to  Table  Al. 
Hendry  and Ericsson  (199 1) and Mehra  (1991).]  The 
similarity  of the  parameter  estimates  of the  regres- 
sions shown  in Tables  Al  and AZ, which  employ  data 
respectively  in levels  and  first  differences,  indicates 
on the  one  hand  that  use of nonstationary  data  is not 
biasing  parameter  estimates  and  on  the  other  hand 
that  differencing  is not  producing  a significant  loss 
of  information. 
The  point  estimate  of the  elasticity  of demand  for 
real  M2  with  respect  to  real  income  is  .95  using 
data  in levels.  The  estimate  using  differenced  data 
was  constrained  to  equal  one  in order  to  make  the 
regression  analysis  conformable  to the  average  indi- 
cator,  where  a  1  percent  change  in  money  is 
associated  with  a  1 percent  change  in nominal  out- 
put.  The  point  estimates  of  the  semi-log  slope  of 
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tunity  cost variable are, respectively,  -  7.4 and  -6.6.  -2.7.  Finally,  the  point  estimates  of the  elasticity 
(This  parameter  gives  the  percentage  change  in real  of real  M2  demand  with  respect  to  the  market  rate 
M2  associated  with  a  1 percentage  point  change  in  of return  on  physical  assets  are,  respectively,  -  .54 
the  cost  of  holding  real  M’Z.) From  1964  on,  this  and  -.95. 
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